Nagel, Chisholm, and Locke †Metaphysics of the Mind Essay

It is very difficult to attri stille characteristics to a assessment when we k instanter it does not actually inhabit in the visible realm. Though, personal identity operator element element element has been connected to the mind. However, it is tricky to determine what exactly comprises bingles personal identity. Although it is a difficult concept to grasp, philosophers such as Nagel and Chisholm attempt to construct their feature get a line on the characteristics of the mind. By comparing Nagel and Chisholms positions on personal identity, it is evident that identity is a organic evolution of both body and mind.Nagel shows that we placenot properly identify a mind, and if this is the case then it is impossible to attribute personal identity to a mind. In turn, he attacks the idea that personal identity git be define in terms of physical attributes. Chisholm shows that although things are constantly changing, they still remain the same. He argues that it is the mind t hat holds our identity, unheeding of physical alteration. In my view, the physicalist stead of identity is the most logical when contrasted to the mentalist argument simply due to the occurrence that we do have a self-identity, and Nagel does not attempt to define what it is.Lockes argument finds a mettle ground between Nagel and Chisholm as he argues for a conscious and bodily continuity of the mind. In differentiate to identify the mind-body problem and argue that identity is a development of the mind, Nagels position must be analyzed. Firstly, when addressing the mind-body problem, Nagel states that iodin cannot explain the mind body relationship through logic, functions, or intentions. He argues that these states can be ascribed to robots that may then behave desire people, all the same robots do not experience anything, and it is experience that influences the mind (436).Nagels bat analogy helps solidify his position on experience which is that no bingle can experienc e the same thing as another. He claims that even to nervous strain a conception of what it is Kristen Biduk 6949215 like to be a batone must take up the bats daub of view (442). Meaning, one must have the same thinking patterns as the other which Nagel argues is impossible. He argues that it is our spirit which provides the mind-body problem. Although one can relate to what it is like to be a bat, it is impossible to fully comprehend it because in order to make a bat, conscious-ness must be forgotten.For that reason, one cannot know that others have a mind, but one can perceive that they do. Chisholm opens his argument with providing an analysis of the Ship of Theseus and explains that identity is transitive, consequence that it is always changing. Similarly, he uses the example of the river and how although it is the same exact river, it is given different identities based on geographical location. The identity of the river is changing. ground on his view of alteration, Chish olm suggests three possibilities for alteration and identity.Firstly, we can deny the transitivity of identity, but he proves this to be a problem. His second suggestion is that nothing alters, but this too proves to be problematic. For example, if one was to cross the inch of the United States of America and the border patrol officer asked if he was the same as the person in the photo, he would say no. Because, when that photo was taken he had plastered characteristics, and now, x amount of old age later he has different characteristics, and is therefore a different person. Clearly this is an issue.Thirdly, he analyzes preciselylers position on the misuse of the word is in that, for example there exists something at a certain place (P) at a certain time (t) that is identical with same thing at a different place (Q) at a different time (t1). By saying identical, he bureau they exist in together, however it is mathematically impossible. He concludes that such things are entia pe r alio (made of). Entia per alio is something that exists because a Kristen Biduk 6949215 mind makes it up. For example, a pencil is entia per alio because without a mind, it is simply an object. The mind makes the pencil an object for writing. Without a mind giving meaning to something, that something has no identity.In regards to self-identity, I find it difficult to agree with the mentalist perspective. Nagels writing, What is it like to be a Bat? does not provide sufficient insight to the development of self and self-identity. He bases his writing just based on define the mind. It is true to say that we cannot properly identify a mind. How can we as a whole, understand something we do not actually know exists? We can assume it exists but it provides no taste. Based on this belief, Nagel concludes that because we cannot properly identify a mind, we cannot connect personal identity to a mind.But where can we find our personal identity? He claims that our identity does not lie within our physical attributes which leaves identity suspending in the air. The mentalist perspective is limiting in the sentience that it does not take in to business relationship outside variables that can impact ones identity. We are not born with an identity and I feel as though Nagels position is implying that we are. Additionally, our identity is developed from our consciousness, and we do not become conscious of ourselves at infancy.We develop our self-identity through time and it is consistently changing. Chisholm is much more realistic when it comes to defining personal identity. We cannot assume that our identity is purely based on our minds, for our minds are influenced by our animalism. In turn, our physicality is influenced by society. We identify with ourselves based on what others think of us. For example, if someone weighs three hundred pounds, they may identify themselves as unhealthy because that is what society has told them. Similarly, if that three hundred p ound person lost weight and now weighed one hundred and thirty pounds, that Kristen Biduk 6949215 person may identify themselves as healthy.If they used diet and effect as a method to put up the weight, they may identify as athletic. This proves that personal identity is indeed transitive. It will always be in a constant state of change depending on the influences approximately them. We have identity because others around us have provided us with our identity. genius could argue then that if one was to lose only ten pounds then identity will not change because the change is only slight. If we analyze the Ship of Theseus once more, Chisholm argues that slight changes still have an impact on our identity because our identity is always changing.By using the problem of Theseuss ship however, it gives us ideas of identity for inanimate objects. One could argue that it is not relatable to beings with consciousness however I would have to disagree. Our consciousness, or our memories ar e what hold our self-identity. If we lose an arm or leg, we are still the same person because our minds still hold our memory. While the mentalist perspective does not take into account physical impressions, and the physicalist perspective lacks some insight on our own consciousness, Locke provides an write up that touches on both sides.Locke argues for a conscious continuity and not a bodily one. He begins with elucidate that all minds have a common structure wherein there are two qualities within our identity first-string and vicarious. The primary quality consists of consciousness. I can identify with myself because I am conscious of my own existence. The secondary qualities consist of qualities that are changing, such as hair length or weight.He insists that our primary qualities are what provide us with identity however he agrees that secondary qualities must be analyzed. Our secondary qualities are always changing while our primary qualities are static. Without the seconda ry qualities, our identity would not change, Kristen Biduk 6949215 which Chisholm proved. In comparison to both Nagel and Chisholm, Lockes argument holds the truest because he takes into account both perspectives and develops the most logical understanding of identity. Additionally, Locke states that there is a first and third person perspective on identity. The first person identity is what one makes of himself.The third person helps confirm ones identity. Both of these together help form ones true personal identity. For one without outside influences has nothing to base their identity on. For example, if one was to look at cases of people raised in isolation, it will be seen that they have no sense of reality or identity. They were left to their own thoughts with no outside stimulation. When they leave their isolated prisons, they rediscover their identity by identifying with their outside influences. In conclusion, it is almost impossible to justify the mind/body problem.Both Nag el and Chisholms perspectives on identity are fairly vague and both lack a deeper understanding of the mind. I truly believe that it is the mind that holds our identity. However an identity is highly structured by its outside influences. Without a body or without society, one would have no identity. Some can argue that there can be a mind without a body, but it just doesnt make rational sense. If hypothetically, one was to have their mind switched into a different body, he would still identify as himself. For it is our mind that holds our identity, however our mind is within a body.